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1. Introduction 
On December 26th 2004, an earthquake in the Indian Ocean created a tsunami that 
killed over 30,000 people in Sri Lanka alone and wrought immense devastation in 
the  southern  and  eastern  regions  of  that  country,  while  simultaneously  causing 
similar  catastrophic  effects  in  other  neighbouring  countries.  In  its  immediate 
aftermath,  basic  survival  and  urgent  relief  were  paramount  but  as  time  passed 
attention  has  also  turned  to  the  re-construction  of  communities  and  industries, 
including  the  re-establishment  of  previous  dominant  business  activities  in  each 
region. Perhaps the worst affected industries in Sri Lanka were fishing, tourism and 
coir fibre production, all of which are located, for obvious reasons, on or near the 
sea. Their recovery is critical because of their economic significance, respectively as 
basic food supplier,  foreign exchange generator  and as the dominant  community 
activity in certain coastal regions.
This  paper  describes  a  brief  research project  that  investigated the impact  of  the 
disaster on small family firms producing coir fibre in South East Sri Lanka, and their 
recovery one year after that catastrophic event.  The initial research objective was to 
focus on the year-long recovery of these small firms, but after fieldwork undertaken 
over Xmas 2005 uncovered far greater destruction to coir-making facilities, such that 
survival as much as any business recovery still pre-occupied these firms and their 
families, the study was broadened to include the management and distribution of aid 
to these small firms.  The underlying hypotheses guiding this research are threefold 
– firstly,  such communities have strong local networks and high levels  of social 
capital which come to the fore in times of crisis; secondly, that business recovery is 
dependent  on  infrastructural  re-establishment;  and  thirdly,  that  the  priorities  and 
types of aid vary over time.
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2. Sri Lanka, the Tsunami and Coir Production
Sri Lanka is a small island with a population of some 19 million people comprising 
74 % Sinhalese, 18 % Tamils 7% Moors and 1% other ethnic minorities. There is 
also religious diversity with 70% Buddhists, 15% Hindus, 8% Christians and 7% 
Muslims1. From  independence  in  1948  until  1977,  it  had  a  strongly  socialist 
economy but  since  then  it  has  been  increasingly  pursuing  privatization,  market-
oriented policies and export-oriented trade. Tea and rubber are important exports, 
but  the  most  dynamic  sectors  are  now  food  processing,  textiles  and  apparel 
production, telecommunications, insurance, and banking. According to the Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka2, recent GDP growth has been above 5% .  Small and medium-
sized enterprises play a very dominant role in the economy of Sri Lanka as major 
contributors  to  its  export  earnings  and  employment.  They  represent  the  largest 
segment by far in the country’s manufacturing sector. 
On 26th Dec 2004 Sri Lanka was hit by massive tsunami waves that arose from a 
powerful earthquake that occurred under the Indian Ocean near Sumatra. Over two 
thirds of the island’s coastline was devastated, killing more than 35,000 people and 
displacing over one million individuals. The waves, as high as 15 feet, penetrated up 
to3 miles inland and swept away people, houses and, unbelievably, even a train with 
1700 passengers. It was the largest human disaster that has happened in Sri Lanka 
over its  recorded history.  The tsunami caused extensive damage to  personal and 
business  property,  while  social  networks  and industrial  infrastructures  were  also 
severely disrupted3. Overall asset loss is estimated at 4.5% of gross domestic product 
(GDP), with reconstruction costs rising up to $1.6 billions.4
The impact of tsunami on SMEs has been very high in terms of the number of 
enterprises affected and the number of SME owners and employees who lost their 
livelihoods.  Of  the  4,000  plus  severely-affected  businesses,  the  majority  were 
1 Government of Sri Lanka Official website
2 Central Bank of Sri Lanka web site 
3  Joint Report of the Government of Sri Lanka and Development partners.
4  Asian Development Bank website, Article A, 2006
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located in the Southern Province, predominantly in the Galle and Matara districts 
and over 800 of these southern firms were micro or small firms dealing in coir-based 
products5. In equipment terms, over 700 retting pits, 30 fibre mills and 1,200 yarn 
spinning machines were destroyed.
Coir fibre is produced from the processed husks of coconuts by retting and yarn 
spinning processes and these fibres are then used to in the making of rope, matting, 
nets, etc.  Since coconut trees are predominantly seashore-based, processing of the 
husks has invariably been located there also, since retting involves immersing the 
husks in water for up to six months.  The processing of husks into fibre and the 
manufacture of coir products are simple, yet major industrial activities in Sri Lanka 
employing many thousands of home-based workers. These activities, in Sri Lanka 
and India, account for over 90% of the world’s manufacture of coir-based products.
3. Survival of SMEs: Recovery and Growth
Growth is an important stage in the life cycle of a small firm. In order for a small 
business to survive it should have a desire to grow, as past research has shown that 
there is a high correlation between these two factors6.  Growth is influenced by many 
factors but primarily these are related to the entrepreneur’s background, the nature 
and environment of the small firm, and the strategic decisions taken by its owner 
managers7.  In order to achieve growth the above components need to be balanced 
appropriately, but due to the complexity and fluidity of this combination, it is very 
difficult to identify whether or not a firm will be a success at start-up8. Although 
many of the growth models assume that entrepreneurs’ motives are to grow their 
small  firms,  not  all  entrepreneurs  are  for  growth,  since  life  style  and  personal 
attitudinal factors as well as market factors may have significant bearing. 
Other barriers to growth exist and can be either external or internal to the small firm. 
5  FCCISL in Action 2005
6  Burns P, 2001
7  Storey, 1994
8  ibid
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External  growth  barriers  include  market  competition,  demand,  availability  of 
finance, and labour constraints, while internal growth barriers consist of, inter alia, 
resource constraints, strategic issues of the owner9.  For rural firms, especially in 
developing  countries,  growth  will  be  particularly  limited  by  market  and  labour 
conditions that are longstanding and even rigid10. Recovery for these small firms, 
following some form of economic disruption, will therefore be even more difficult 
when resources are so constrained. The role of national governments, NGOs and aid 
agencies in financially assisting such traumatised firms, to recover become critical11.
4. Disaster Management
Pelling’s succinct definition of a disaster - “the outcome of hazard and vulnerability 
coinciding”12 - clearly describes the situation that Sri Lanka faced when the tsunami 
hit  that  country.  Disaster,  he  further  defines,  is  a  state  of  major  disruption  to 
systematic  function.   Such situations appear to pass through  Laplante’s  four-phase 
‘Disaster Cycle’:-
• Emergency Phase: Period of high consensus in the community, with much 
altruistic behaviour aimed at preventing or reducing human suffering.
• Restoration  Phase:  Activities  that  will  return  the  community  to  normal 
functioning are undertaken.
• Reconstruction  Phase:  Semblance  of  normal  functioning  is  achieved, 
activities  aimed  at  permanence  begin.  Families  return  to  home,  work  or 
school and community rebuilding starts.
• Development  Reconstruction  Phase:  Plans  and  actions  decided  upon 
during the earlier reconstruction are implemented.13
It  is clear from the above disaster cycle that soon after  a disaster the immediate 
concern will be to prevent human suffering rather than starting to rebuild livelihood. 
Once the community is at a stage of mental and physical stability then reconstruction 
may begin. When disaster hits, huge amounts of aid will flow from different sources 
9  Burns, 2001
10 Chuta E  & Sethuraman S, 1984.
11  Wattanapruttipaisan, 2003
12 Pelling, 2003, p 5.
13 ibid.
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and with such aid, comes the risk of corruption by middleman and suppliers as well 
as officials.  Hence government organisations, international agencies and NGOs try 
to ensure that the aid delivery and reconstruction work give priority to, ‘maximising 
the effectiveness of existing laws and procedures to minimise and deter corruption  
in tsunami relief and reconstruction’14
In some situations disaster relief efforts may be slow due to various internal and 
external reasons. For example, regarding tsunami disaster relief efforts, it was found 
that key bureaucratic problems - slow decision-making, failure to absorb and process 
outside information, and entrenched commitment to failed courses of action – were 
evident15.  Furthermore,  it  was  found  that  lack  of  national  level  coordination, 
shortage of skilled labour for construction, accountability, communications and the 
need to sustain the momentum built were the key challenges of the post tsunami 
recovery process.  Government officials as well as donor community has confirmed 
that poor co-ordination had lead to many instances when decisions and action taken 
are conflicting and resulting lot of overlapping and duplication16.
5. Social Capital and Small Firms
Social capital consists of “the norms and social relations embedded in the social 
structures of societies that enable people to co-ordinate action and achieve desired 
goals”17.   It  is  seen  as  a  logically  creditable  way of  discussing  issues  of  social 
responsibility and acknowledging contributions made by business or other groups to 
society. Social capital thus provides a basis to businesses to congregate and generate 
advantages  through  shared  resources  enabling  societies  to  prosper  and  develop 
sustainable economies18.
Social Capital also permeates in the informal networks that exist in all societies.
By examining informal networks in urban and rural regions, Kingsley and Malecki 
14 Khalid & Rahman, 2005, p 36.
15 Takeda & Helms, 2006
16 Weerasekara, 2005
17 Huppi and Seemann, 2001,p 4
18 Spence, Habisch and Schmidpeter, 2004
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have found that small firms use the informal networks for different types of advice, 
whether it is product development, competitive concerns, or labour issues. But above 
all, their focus is upon fashioning an informal network that works for them19. This is 
developed even further where membership of long-standing communities provide 
links to professional, business or status groups or networks.  According to Marger, 
business  networks  often  develop  around  the  entrepreneurs'  private  networks, 
building on their social capital to create equally favourable relationships satisfying a 
combination of business and social needs20.
The key philosophy underpinning social capital lies in generalised reciprocity21. For 
Putnam, social capital has both individual and collective aspects. Connections are 
initiated through selfish motivations, but this transcends to wider benefits for others 
in  the  community.  The  advantage  of  community  participation  lies  in  the  social 
capital  generated  through interactions  with  other  members.  Social  capital  within 
communities flourishes on the basis of generalised norm of reciprocity commonly 
applied  to  business  behaviour.  The  generalised  rule  of  reciprocity  suggests 
participants in a network will behave in a manner that they themselves would expect 
to be treated. In a case of a disaster, social capital flows outwards to help those in 
need in all ways possible.
6. Methodology
Three approaches to data collection were employed. Two surveys using structured 
questionnaires collected data from samples of  coir fibre producers from two regions 
– the south-eastern region around Matara that was heavily affected by the tsunami 
(sample of 35 yarn spinners plus 5 mill owners) and an unaffected region north of 
Colombo  (sample  of  25  yarn  spinners  and  5  mill  owners).  By  this  simple 
comparative method, issues concerning business activity, pre- and post-tsunami, can 
be contrasted as well as providing information on inter-regional support. Questions 
19 Kingsley, Malecki E J,2004, Vol. 23, Iss. 1; p. 71
20 Marger, M.: 2001
21 Putnam, 2000
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focussed on firms’ efforts to re-establish their businesses and the support given by 
aid agencies,  government sources and the wider community.  Particular questions 
sought  information  on  a  range  of  internal  and  external  factors  including  labour 
availability, equipment replacement policies, income flows over one year, types and 
distribution of business aid and the role of other stakeholders within the community. 
 
In addition, twelve face-to-face interviews were also held with representatives of aid 
agencies (Oxfam),  NGOs,  and trade associations  (eg,  Coir  Council  International, 
Coconut  Development  Authority,  Coir  Mill  Owners’  Society),  officials  from the 
Industrial Development Boards of Galle and Matara, and even the heads of religious 
organisations active in the affected region’s relief work.  With these interviews the 
emphasis was on acquiring evidence on the management and distribution of aid to 
the small firms, especially its variation over time.
The main research topics can be summarised as an examination of the following:
• Recovery Process, one year after the tsunami, including details of finances 
and operations, equipment needs, industrial infrastructure, etc. 
• Role  and  Efficacy  of  Aid  Agencies  and  the  Government  in  helping  the 
affected SMEs to recover via distribution of Aid.
• Role of the non-affected coir community in assisting the affected people. 
7. Findings
Of our sample of 40 affected firms, most were devastated as a result of severe 
damage to equipment and/or retting pits, as outlined below. All the Mill owners lost 
everything and while some yarn spinners were only partially affected, not one 
survived unscathed.
Table 1: Extent of Damage
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7.1 Recovery of Small firms Post-Tsunami
The  coir  industry  was  one  of  the  worst  affected  industries  as  noted  by  all  the 
interviewees yet one year after, the yarn spinning sector has recovered to such an 
extent that the Oxfam representative claimed that the yarn spinners are now working 
normally.  But  it  was  clear  to  the  field  researcher  that  some  spinners  have  not 
recovered  psychologically  and  others  were  doing  very  little  with  the  apparent 
intention of just gaining more aid. 
Income Effects on Affected Firms: The level of income was categorized at 5 stages 
- income before tsunami, 1, 3, 6 months and 1 year after the tsunami. Incomes of 
yarn spinners before the tsunami were typically between 2 and 6 thousand rupees per 
month,  with  the  older  firms  having  higher  incomes,  while  mill  owners  had 
significantly  higher incomes -  up to 12 thousand rupees (190 SLR = £1).  Fig 1 
displays 7 seven categories against time with the average incomes noted being the 
average  of  the  sample  of  yarn  spinners  and  mill  owners  at  a  particular  time.  It 
indicates that mill owners, who had more fixed assets initially, have yet not fully 
recovered, while yarn spinners, with fewer assets, have recovered to their former 
income levels. 
Extent of Damage Yarn Spinners Mills Total
Survived unscathed 0 0 0
Partially destroyed, but continued 9 0 9
Totally destroyed, started afresh 24 5 29
Destroyed, started another business 2 0 2
                             Total 35 5 40
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Fig 1: Income Trends of the Yarn spinners & Mill owners in Affected Areas
Income  Effects  on  Non-Affected  Firms:  Of  the  25  yarn  spinners  in  the  non-
affected area, few experienced any direct business effects at all, but 7 of them did 
suggest indirect factors such as  transport unavailability (as trucks were diverted for 
emergency relief), buyer/supplier disruptions and family deaths.  It is also clear that 
these yarn spinners did not profit from the problems further south. For the five mill 
owners in the unaffected area, little or no effects were noted. Figure 2 illustrates the 
transition period in the non-affected area. 
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Fig 2: Income Trends of the yarn spinners & mill owners in Unaffected Areas
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7.2  Reasons for Slow Recovery 
Predisposition towards growth by many of the lower income earners in  the coir 
industry is very low as their primary motives will be to maintain their day-to-day 
living rather than worrying about growth. But it will be different in higher earners as 
they will be able to generate additional resources to be allocated towards growth. 
But both groups clearly wished to recover business at least to former levels.
Mill Owners: For mill owners the main reasons for their slow recovery appear to be 
damaged  machinery,  lack  of  aid/finance,  labour  unavailability  and  lack  of  raw 
materials. The latter reason arose because most retting pits were destroyed and few 
spinners had yet re-established themselves to supply materials. Labour unavailability 
was  prevalent  because  many  workers  had  not  returned  to  work  due  to  their 
traumatised state (and it was observed that there is no mechanism in the system to 
counsel such people). The mill owners, along with other higher incomer groups such 
as exporters, appear to have received little or no financial aid for business recovery 
(confirmed through interviews with them and the aid agency representative).
Yarn Spinners: Yarn spinners do not need large sums of finance as they only used 
one type of simple machine and the business is usually carried on in the owners’ 
residence. Moreover, there are loan schemes such as “Susahana” which is given to 
small firms by the government22.  The medium scale entrepreneurs either uses their 
internal finance such as own savings or go for loan schemes provided by banks. This 
is the normal way of financing SMEs in Sri Lanka, but it was not the same after the 
tsunami  as  banks  appeared  less  willing  to  give  loans  to  medium-sized  or  large 
businesses loans that had even been only partially affected.
Below are the survey results obtained from the yarn spinners as to what business-
related factors contributed to slow growth, with relevant commentary following.
Table 2: Business-Related Reasons for slow recovery
22 Central Bank of Sri Lanka web site
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Business Factors
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Damaged Machinery 0 2 1 2 28
Decreased Supply of Coconuts 0 0 5 14 16
Low Demand for Fibre Prodn. 2 16 3 14 0
Bad Condition of Pits 0 0 6 2 27
Shortage of Labour 4 11 8 5 7
Insufficient Aid 0 10 0 15 10
Availability of Transport 0 3 29 0 3
Slow Re-estab’t of Cust. links 0 13 20 2 0
Lack of Business Advice 3 6 0 6 20
Out of the 35 yarn spinners almost all  agreed that  damaged machinery and pits 
affected recovery,  obvious since the equipment  was essential  to their  production 
(those who disagreed over machinery damage did not use any machines even before 
tsunami as they were from area that spun yarn manually). 
The polarity of opinions regarding low demand arose from whether the respondents 
had, or had not, received new machinery and yarn as aid, since those with such aid 
contributed immediately to greater supply thus reducing demand. Those that got aid 
for replacing machinery were prominent amongst those who cited lack of business 
advice as another reason. In essence, little or no ‘after-aid’ support was provided.
Another survey of non-business-related factors affecting yarn spinners generated the 
responses  displayed  in  Table  3  below. Whilst  the  condition  of  roads  and 
communications  appeared  to  have  some  effect,  there  was  a  surprising  strong 
agreement that food supply and medical facilities and consequently personal health, 
were particularly problematic. This must be largely due to the quick response to help 
the  affected  community  by  the  non-affected  and  the  international  community. 
Housing on the other hand was more influential as many of those affected would 
have operated their business machinery within their homes which may have been 
destroyed.
Table 3: Non-Business Related Reasons for Slow Recovery
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Non Business Factors
Affecting Recovery
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree N/A Agree
Strongly 
Agree
Condition of Roads 0 13 9 11 2
Availability of Fuel 1 4 30 0 0
Poor Food supply 19 16 0 0 0
Poor Medical Conditions 12 22 1 0 0
Poor housing 1 11 1 18 4
State of Personal Health 1 23 6 4 1
Damage to commun. facilities 6 14 12 3 0
7.3 Aid Distribution and Management
Soon after tsunami the government instructed the relief agencies and donors that no 
new construction or livelihood activities be supported within a coastal  belt up to 
100m from sea in the south, west and up to 200 meters in the North West. For this 
reason  the  people  who  lived  with  in  these  areas  did  not  receive  any  aid  for 
reconstruction. However, 10 months after the disaster, the government decided to 
narrow the zone to 50 metres in the south, and 80 metres in the north and east, 
depending on the vulnerability of the area to future threats from the sea23.
IDB conducted a survey in January to identify the most affected sectors and the 
results  were  given  to  the  government  and  foreign  agencies  to  be  used  for  aid 
distribution. Hence aid was immediately given to the worst affected yarn spinners. 
The next step which government prepared was to help the mill owners but lack of 
funds inhibited this, especially since the amount spent to support one miller could be 
used  to  help  40-50 yarn  spinners.  Table  4  indicates  the sources  of  aid  for  yarn 
spinners and shows that NGOs (primarily aid agencies) were the first to offer and 
distribute aid with government aid arriving a little later, influenced perhaps in part 
by the explanations above. 
Table 4: Sources of Aid & Timing of Aid for Affected Yarn Spinners
23 Inter press service new agency website 2005
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The aid given to yarn spinners for business recovery consisted mainly of a yarn 
machine and some free coir. Out of 35 respondents 27 received a free machine to 
restart their business and 26 of them received raw coir to start spinning. The support 
given for the reconstruction of premises and pit construction was very low compared 
to the support given to buy machinery, which somewhat handicapped any further 
progress. Much of the machinery supplied to both spinners and mill owners was not
necessarily new, but at least it was as good as their previous machines and there 
were few complaints. 
Table 5: Forms of Business Support
 
7.4 Other Sources of Aid 
As a Buddhist country that follows the teachings of Lord Buddha, SL’s people are 
very considerate about helping each other in times of need. As such it comes as no 
surprise when the tsunami aid generated through social capital reached remarkable 
levels.  Khalid  &  Rahman  note  that  the  international  and  public  sector  made  an 
Organisation Name 1st Month 3-6 Months 6-12 Months
National Government  0 14 2
NGO 12   9 0
Private Sector Firms   0   3 0
Trade Organisations   0   0 0
Local Community   0   0 6
Regional Community   0   2 1
Form of Support 0<25% 25<50% 50<75% 75<100% 100%
Purchase Machinery 8 0 0 0 27
Repair Machinery 35 0 0 0 0
Reconstruct Premises 33 0 0 2 0
Purchase of Supplies 9 0 20 6 0
Pit Reconstruction 25 6 4 0 0
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impressive contribution to assist the affected areas24.  According to research done on 
tsunami reconstruction and redevelopment in the Maldives, it is found that workers 
from various communities were brought together to assist in social reconstruction25, 
indicating that the community plays a major role in disaster relief by means of social 
capital. From at least one interviewee, it was noted that the response given by the 
non-affected  and the  international  community  has  been  remarkable  -  as  a  result 
everyone got food, clothing and shelter at the time of need.
All  the religious leaders helped the affected community without any religious or 
cultural favouritism. For example the Buddhist temple in Madampe, was a refugee 
camp until the end of April 05. Food, clothing and medical assistance was given to 
everyone who came. The temple received food and other essentials with the aid of 
the non-affected community. The religious organisations also built houses for the 
affected with the aid of the non-affected community, but they did not give any aid 
for business recovery. The bond between the temple and the people increased as a 
result of all the help given to them.
24  of  affected  yarn  spinners  obtained  temporary  accommodation  in  the  village 
temple immediately after tsunami, and another 9 received immediate family support 
as they had family living in non affected areas. Support from the local community 
was  not  available  since  it  was  clearly  in  much the  devastated  state  as  the  yarn 
spinners. All 35 yarn spinners agreed that the wider non-affected community had 
helped them significantly by giving food, clothing, etc. Most also received food and 
clothing from the temple, while a few relied on family. Only family support helped 
with reconstruction work for 16 spinners.
 
Table 6: Types of Aid received from wider Community
24  Khalid & Rahman, 2005
25  Pardasani, 2006
Form of Aid Received Family
Local 
Community
Wider 
Non-Affected 
Community
Religious 
Org'ns
Temporary Accommodation  9 2 24
Food Clothing and Water 12 35 33
Labour for Prem Reconstructn 16
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|In the survey of the non-affected region, there were many examples of support from 
non-affected spinners and mill owners as individuals, and as a collective response. 
Of the 25 yarn spinners in the non-affected area, 24 of them said as an individual, 
they sent “as much as food and clothing as they could”, and in some cases also 
donated  money.   These  individual  contributions  were  all  given  to  the  affected 
community in general and not specifically to the coir producers. All 5 mill owners 
said in the non-affected area also said that they gave, “as much food and clothing as 
they could” and one of them gave money towards disaster relief. Also another mill 
owner said that he gave a lorry to transport food and clothing to the affected areas.
However,  there appeared to be little collective support  as coir  producers,  if  only 
because there appeared to be little collective business organisation in that area. But 
the CDA (Coconut Development Authority) was active to some extent and the IDB 
in  Galle  organised  coir  from Kurunegala  (a  non-affected  area)  to  be  distributed 
among the affected spinners.
8. Discussion and Conclusions
The main research objective was to find out how well the SMEs in one particular 
industry in Sri Lanka have recovered one year after the tsunami. The findings show 
that these firms have not yet fully recovered, the main reasons being the imbalance 
of specialist aid for business recovery, labour shortages and general inefficiencies of 
aid management.
The  results  from  the  surveys  shows  that  while  individual  yarn  spinners  have 
recovered to a great extent, much more needs to be achieved to return to pre-tsunami 
conditions. The reason for this situation is that in giving aid to the coir industry, all 
the  aid  distributors  gave  initially  to  yarn  spinners  as  the  cost  of  helping  them 
individually is lower than the cost of helping millers and exporters. Thus there was 
uneven recovery for the industry as a whole. Although the millers received very little 
aid, they have somehow managed to recover with private support and intense will 
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and commitment to survive and grow. 
The recovery process has followed a similar trajectory as outlined by Pelling26 and 
discussed earlier.  Unfortunately, as with many disasters, inefficiencies exist.  One 
analysis of the tsunami disaster relief efforts identified bureaucratic delays and slow 
decision-making as key problems27. International donors (NGOs) have played a vital 
role  in  the business  recovery  process  yet  a weakness  seen  in  the  system of  aid 
management  was  that  there  is  little  or  no  coordination  between  the  parties  that 
distribute aid, which led to duplication of aid as well as important segments of the 
industry being neglected28. 
Social  capital  played a major role in aiding the coir  industry.  As a result of  the 
immediate  response,  food,  housing  and  medical  assistance  were  not  significant 
factors in the business recovery process. Research by Gupta & Sharma on why the 
recovery process has been slower and less efficient in the small island communities 
in India as compared to mainland communities, found that, “good governance and 
social capital are important elements for ensuring equitable recovery processes”29 
The  recovery  process  in  Sri  Lanka  was  more  successful,  due  mainly  to  the 
involvement of wider, non-affected community. 
Yet growth in the coir industry in Sri Lanka is general is slow due in part to its 
maturity and the reluctance of the younger generation to enter the industry due to 
more urban job opportunities, a phenomenon well known in development studies30. 
The  tsunami  has  simply  reinforced  or  accelerated  that  trend.  Coupled  with  the 
perennial  lack  of  readily  available  finance  that  dogs  many  small  firms,  again 
exacerbated  by  the  disaster  when  many  Sri  Lankan  banks  become  even  more 
reluctant to offer loans, the continuing recovery, albeit slow, of the coir industry, and 
even its future, is a matter of concern.
26 Pelling (2003
27 Takeda & Helms, 2006
28 Weerasekara, 2005
29 Gupta & Sharma, 2006
30 Chuta & Sethuraman, 1984
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